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Bringing Nature to Light: Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie in the Early System of Identity
Michael Vater

Light is already a completely ideal activity that deconstructs and
reconstructs objects just as the light of idealism always does—
and so Naturphilosophie provides a physical explanation of
idealism, which proves that at the boundaries of nature there
must break forth the intelligence we see break forth in the
guise of humanity [Person des Menschen].
Schelling, General Deduction of Dynamic Process, § 631
In November of 1800 the issue of the reality of nature and its meaning for a
transcendental philosophy interrupts, or rather heats up, the exchange of letters
between Fichte in Berlin and Schelling in Jena. Fichte has faint praise for the
latter‟s System of Transcendental Idealism and marks as problematic the way it
sets nature alongside of consciousness as the subject of a genetic deduction. For
transcendental philosophy, he insists, nature can only be something found,
finished, perfect because lawful, but whose lawfulness is not its own, but that of
the intelligence which beholds and explains.2 Schelling responds with a long
recital of his philosophical development and poses several alternative ways that
philosophy of nature might coincide with Wissenschaftslehre, the most radical of
which suggests that philosophy of consciousness must be based on natural
philosophy, not the reverse. Schelling refers to the final paragraphs of the second
part of General Deduction of the Dynamic Process as a brief summary of his
position.3 They read as if they were penned for Fichte‟s eyes, or those of his
stand-in, Carl Eschenmayer. Beiser is correct in viewing Schelling‟s writings on
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nature of 1799 and 1800 as an outright realism or naturalism, quite consistent
with the Spinozism of the 1801 Presentation of My System.4
This paper will present a brief overview of three critical texts of the early
so-called Identity-Philosophy—the 1800 Dynamic Process, the 1801
Presentation of My System, and the posthumously published 1804 lectures on The
Entire System of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature in Particular. I
concur, however, with Schelling‟s later judgment on his work when he deems the
whole of his early philosophy Naturphilosophie and again refers to light as the
phenomenon that links the world studied by the physical sciences with
philosophy of spirit.5 The human is the one being where nature has come to light
or where a God different from Spinoza‟s deus sive natura begins to manifest. All
three of these „earlier‟ works on nature contain passages that could have been
lifted, were it not for time‟s arrow, from the 1809 Essay on Freedom.
One need not rehearse Schelling‟s early essays on the philosophy of
nature.6 Suffice it to say that given the state of what we now call the physical
sciences—where in physics the materialism and experimentalism of Newton‟s
followers overtopped the vitalism of Leibniz and Goethe, where few but
important chemical elements were identified but largely left explained, and where
biology was but a gleam in the eye of poets and philosophers—every essay was a
new beginning and one was forced either to begin with Kant‟s construction of
matter or to start at the other end and look to biological phenomena such as the
self-reverting and self-transforming activity which Schelling calls “irritability” or
“excitability” to find a general pattern to display the order of nature that
intellectual intuition discovers in philosophical construction.7 Though Schelling
4

Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the Struggle against Subjectivism—1781-1801 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 557.
5
See On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 119-120. Also Ian Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling
(London, New York: Continuum, 2006), chapters 2 and 3, 26-118.
6
See the admirable translation of Schelling‟s Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) by Harris
and Heath. The volume contains supplements from 1803 that the translators regard as “arcane.”
Keith Peterson adds a brief but lucid introduction to his translation of the 1799 First Outline of a
System of the Philosophy of Nature. Frederick Beiser‟s eight chapters on Schelling in German
Idealism: the Struggle against Subjectivism—1781-1801 put Schelling‟s ideas on nature in a
manner accessible to current debates about materialism and neuroscience. Eckart Förster‟s two
chapters on Schelling provide valuable information on the influence of Baader and Eschenmayer on
Schelling‟s thinking at the turn of the century. See The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A
Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University
Press, 2012), chapter 9 and 10; hereafter cited as Twenty-Five Years.
7
For the former alternative, see Schelling‟s1803 essay Über die Konstruction in der Philosophie
from The Critical Journal, in Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A.
Schelling (Stuttgart & Augsburg: Cotta 1856-61), I/5, 126-140 [hereafter cited as SW
series/volume, page] and also his 1802 essay “On Philosophical Construction and the Way to
Exhibit All Things in the Absolute” in PRFS, 212-225. For the latter, see Schelling‟s attempt to
begin Naturphilosophie with organic systems rather than inorganic matter in the 1799 First Outline
of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith Peterson (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2004), 53-69, and especially his comments on John Brown‟s discovery of excitability,
p. 66, n.# and pp. 67-69, n.§.

2

gives over his philosophy more and more to Spinoza, both in form and content, in
the 1801 essay and the 1804 lectures, the heart of nature remains an archetype
intuited in its ektypes or a pattern whose self-reinforced repetition (Potenzierung)
expands to include all the „discoveries‟ of the Newtonian “atomists” and
“physicists.” One might smile at the naiveté of the philosopher with her few tools
and cosmic ambitions, but even today physicists are sometimes heard to mumble
strange things about the universe‟s fondness for order or nature‟s amenability to
mathematics.
I.
The 1800 General Deduction of the Dynamic Process appeared in the first two
issues of Schelling‟s Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik, the first half before the
publication of the System of Transcendental Idealism, with the more ambitious
second part following after. The first half has the aim of tightening the links
between magnetism, electricity and chemical interaction that earlier versions of
natural philosophy had suggested, replacing analogical connection with
argument. The three levels of natural operation designate items which are
primitive in nature but recursive, and as such can serve as categories of the
utmost generality for the study of nature.8 Schelling initially claims that these
categories correspond to the three dimensions of space.9 The second half
strengthens the claim, maintaining that primary processes of magnetism,
electricity, and chemical interaction coincide with the construction of matter, that
is, determine matter‟s occupation of space.10 We shall return to this shortly.
Both sections of the Deduction stipulate that the endeavor of
Naturphilosophie is to present a “genetic deduction” of nature‟s primary process,
the outbreak of difference within identity and its subsequent suppression, or
“nature‟s infinite striving to return to original identity.”11 There must be at least
two forces that are opposed in matter, as Kant had argued, and they cannot differ
merely in direction, but in quality—as positive and negative—and posited in one
subject.12 The forces are never separated, so the deduction exhibits opposition
within synthesis or synthesis within opposition,13 the same structure evident in
the System of Transcendental Idealism and generally in conformity with Fichte‟s
Wissenschaftslehre.
Schelling claims he is now able to advance beyond the analogical
surmise of the First Outline of a Philosophy of Nature and establish by argument
that magnetism is the primary form of natural operation, that it involves „action at
a distance‟ since both expansive (positive) and retarding (negative) forces are not
localized but spread throughout matter, that the magnetic phenomena which are
8
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observable are only initial and incomplete versions of chemical oxidation, hence
that primary magnetism is a property of matter as such and not tied to any
specific “magnetic material.”14 What distinguishes the Naturphilosophie of 18001804 is a simultaneous drive toward ontological generality and toward the
reduction of physical hypotheses, e.g., the notions of “magnetic” or “electrical
matter,” or the isolation of the so-called galvanic phenomenon from electricity
and chemical interaction. The construction of matter is the sole task of
Naturphilosophie, and it is an idealistic one, in that matter is a problem for
philosophy to solve, not the postulation of a self-existent entity.15
The bulk of the first half of the Dynamic Process essay is devoted to
developing the similarities and differences between the array of positive and
negative forces in primary magnetism and electricity. In the former, the
dimension of length is established, with three points sufficient to establish
magnetism: a positive pole, a negative, and a point where the two cancel each
other out or attain indifference. In the latter, the positive charge must be
conceived as not as continuous but as concentrated in a single point, whereas the
negative must be conceived as counteracting this charge from all directions. The
schema of magnetism is the line, that of electricity the angle; they manifest both
the outbreak and the sublation of difference within identity, or the synthesis of
the two forces. Whereas magnetic forces work continuously through the length of
a body, electrical forces work on the surfaces of bodies.16 Magnetic force is
communicated by contact between bodies, electrical by “dispersion” or reciprocal
attraction.17
Schelling opens the second part of this essay with some methodological
reflections. The genetic method speculation employs takes the all-at-once or
finished character of nature apart and displays its individual moments as a series
of stages the subject moves through. Instead of starting out with a conceptual
analysis of matter dependent on some definition, e.g., something impenetrable or
occupying space and endowed with two opposing forces, one of which repels
influence from without and one which posits an outside (or attractive) force to an
equal degree—a synthetic deduction (or construction) will show in discrete
stages how space is occupied to a determinate degree and will reveal the
mechanism that effects the relationship of the two forces.18 Of course, it is Kant‟s
deduction of matter in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft
that Schelling means to criticize and supplant. Hitherto, e.g., in the 1797 Ideas
for a Philosophy of Nature, he had adopted both Kant‟s starting point, the
deduction of matter, and its analysis, something that occupies space as a result of
the equilibrium of opposing expansive and retarding forces, although he noted
that Newton himself was hesitant about the ontological standing of the retarding
(attractive) force, unwilling to confess either it was an occult quality or to
14
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concede it was a pure postulate lacking an empirical basis.19 In 1798 Franz von
Baader published On the Pythagorean Square in Nature, or the Four WorldRegions and took Schelling to task for his uncritical acceptance of Kant‟s
analysis. Repulsive and attractive forces themselves were unable to account for
the filling of space without the addition of a synthetic third item, gravity proper.20
Schelling takes over Baader‟s argument and amplifies it, but not without
subjecting Kant‟s position to a detailed critique. To get space filled by the two
available forces, Kant supposes that the expansive one penetrates a body and
works outward against another at a point of contact, while a second, retarding one
is imagined as working upon the first from all directions. The supposition
accurately describes the two electrical forces, but it fails as an explanation of
matter, since it presumes the existence of a body, which was the very item to be
explained.21 A second criticism objects to Kant‟s adoption of empirical data
about the expansive force to support the postulation of the opposite attractive
force that is supposed to limit it. This can neither provide a determinate degree of
limitation for the two forces nor a determinate degree of a body‟s occupation of
space.22 A third criticism notes that if Kant had avoided begging the question by
supposing something already existing, there is no way the postulated forces could
remain proportional and not suppress each other or reach a point of nullity.23
Schelling gets to his (and Baader‟s) solution of adding gravity as the
third force by demanding that the construction of space move forward and
reconcile the apparent linear opposition of the forces in the first dimension to
their surface-to-surface opposition in the second dimension. The construction
moves from line to square to cube: the third unifies the first two, just as gravity
comprehends and unifies repulsive and attractive forces. More exactly, the
definitional “impenetrability” of matter results from a determinate degree of
repulsive force spread over a spatial something, countered by a proportional
degree of attractive force working at a distance or from all points. Schelling
concludes that matter is therefore not something that exists in itself, but as a
solution to the metaphysical problem of the construction of the spatial
dimensions. And the same holds for authentic science: matter is not a reality in
itself, but a solution to the mathematical problem of the relation between the two
forces.24
What has Schelling‟s construction accomplished? It has achieved nothing
more than the genetic explanation of space and its occupation by „something.‟
Only with gravity do we have a phenomenon capable of empirical notice, while
repulsion remains behind the scene as what fills space and attraction functions as
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the motive force in gravity.25 To arrive at a richer phenomenology and provide an
account for magnetism, electricity, and chemical process in the narrower sense as
operations affecting some parts of nature and capable of empirical measurement,
all the first-order processes discussed to this point—which are indeed universal
properties of matter—must be placed below the perceptual threshold and secondorder correlates introduced for what we perceive.26 Schelling recalls the
categories of the System of Transcendental Idealism in naming the first-order
dynamic processes “productive nature” and the second-order “reproductive.”
Whereas first-order chemical process specified the “gravity” that makes matter
fill space, second-order gravity is the light that distinguishes phenomena for
perception.27 And since light is close to thought, a “reproduction of reproduction”
is possible in the organic world where the organism serves as the natural basis for
intelligence.28
We cannot follow this text in further detail, but must look to its final
section where Schelling voices his ideas about the relation of relation of
Naturphilosophie and transcendental idealism—before they have been batted
about in the combative back-and-forth of the Correspondence with Fichte. He
makes at least seven distinct observations, none of which is tightly attached to the
particular consideration of matter, space and dynamic processes previously
discussed.
(1) Dynamics—the construction of matter—stands related to natural
philosophy as transcendental explanation is related to philosophy as a whole. It
does the heavy lifting.
(2) The System of Transcendental Idealism establishes parallels between
dynamic features of inorganic mater and receptivity, sensitivity, and intuition in
the ideal order. It thus functions as a physical proof of idealism.
(3) Naturphilosophie coincides with idealism inasmuch as it establishes
the organism as the basis of reason. Idealism is nonetheless correct in
maintaining that reason is self-positing.
(4) A person will learn that theoretical realism is identical with idealism
when she comes to put her subjectivity aside. This remark is repeated in the
Preface and the initial definition of reason in the 1801 Presentation of My
System; the charge that Fichte‟s rendition of transcendental idealism favored
subjectivity becomes Schelling‟s lifelong (stock-in-trade) criticism of Fichte.
(5) Nature can be viewed as the human species‟ “transcendental
memory” in something akin to Plato‟s theory of anamnesis. The remark may
prefigure the teachings of the later philosophies of freedom and of revelation that
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humans originated in a “ground” of nature now posited as past, but will grow into
a spiritual future.
(6) Parallels between qualities in matter and sensations in mind, between
reactions and intuition in the two orders, and between animate beings and reason
recall the old doctrine of the human being as the center of creation. This view
becomes central to the philosophy of freedom in 1809 and the philosophy of
revelation of Schelling‟s later philosophy, which he began to expound in the
1820‟s.
(7) Philosophy can travel two paths—from us humans towards nature, or
from nature to us—but the true path is the one that nature has actually followed.
This last comment is explicitly naturalistic. It is interesting that in 1804 lectures
on nature Schelling begins to use the Anglophone word Evolution to indicate
potentiation or level-jumping development within a given “potency” or in nature
as a whole.29
II.
Although Schelling intended his 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy
to be a complete more geometrico exposition of the entire system, difficulties
with Christian Gabler, the publisher of his Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik,
forced him to truncate the essay and postpone its projected completion—the
organic nature section of the Naturphilosophie and the philosophy of spirit. A
note where the 1801 exposition breaks off—and the 1804 Entire System lectures
which conclude with a “Construction of the Ideal World and Its Potencies”—
provide a fair clue as to what the missing sections might have looked like, 30
especially since the 1804 lectures focus on Spinoza‟s Ethics almost as
obsessively as the 1801 exposition.31
My System originated in the challenges Schelling faced from Fichte and
Eschenmayer: from the former, whether Naturphilosophie was consistent with
transcendental idealism or in some sense still part of the movement that traced its
roots back to Kant‟s Critiques, from the latter, whether Naturphilosophie could
be an independent philosophical science or whether it needed to be grounded in a
broader metaphysics such as the Wissenschaftslehre. That Schelling adopts
Spinoza‟s metaphysics as his model, both in form and content, shows him
digging in his heels on the naturalism his 1799 and 1800 essays had displayed.
That a “metaphysics of identity” is deployed to ground philosophy of nature and
unite it with an explanation of the potencies and the individuals of appearance
shows that he understood the force of Eschenmayer‟s objection that
Naturphilosophie was a premature science.32
29
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In the course of the serious disputes that characterize their letters from
late in the autumn of 1800 onwards, Schelling sent Fichte issues of his Zeitschrift
für spekulative Physik that contained the second part of the Dynamic Process
treatise and the Presentation of My System. We have no idea whether Fichte read
the former, but he took detailed notes on the later—until he stopped at the
boundary between metaphysics and philosophy of nature, § 51: “The first relative
totality is matter.”33 He showed good sense as a reader, in some respects, though
he might have gone on a page or two more to the Corollary: “Matter is the prime
existent.” The existent had already been metaphysically deduced in the theorems
on individuation, §§ 32-41, and though the ground/existence paradigm is
employed in the Naturphilosophie, Schelling gave no indication that the
paradigm structures the discussion as a whole. If the reader is not already familiar
with the Naturphilosophie, that section of the My System can seem to be an addon, or worse, something wholly redundant. Unless one reads quite far into the
discussion of nature, the work‟s overall structure cannot readily come into view,
viz., where absolute identity infected with duplicity and restored to relative
identity or totality—the metaphysics of identity, in short——is ground, matter
the first existent, organism the second existent, and embodied intelligence
(human being) the third. Schelling remarks in the 1804 Entire System that he had
used the Spinozistic mode of exposition to briefly state what he wished to say
and not to say what he did not wish to say.
On second view, however, there is a fairly tight connection between the
four key thematic elements in the system: (1) the metaphysical consideration of
the individual; (2) the structural identity of all the potencies; (3) the constructed
line that symbolizes A = B or potentiated identity-in-difference, and (4) the
construction of matter as the concurrence of opposite forces in three-dimensional
space. Because absolute identity exists in the universe in the same way it exists in
the individual,34 the individual is infinite in itself,35 or, relative to itself, it is
totality or the universe.36 In the way it is or stands in being, as opposed to the
way it is connected to and exhibits the universe, the individual entity is a
connection of opposed factors, subjective and objective, and symbolized by A =
B in contrast to the pure A = A of absolute identity. Its form of being is distorted
identity, but it is expressed in all possible variations of potencies, so that it can be
expressed as a line between A and B, or between the subjective and the
objective.37 As it is posited or steps forth in being, the apparent individual is at
one and the same time the relative identity of the factors, their relative duplicity,
and their reunion as relative totality,38 or the line of identity, the angle of
duplicity, and their union in the third dimension, existent as matter or filled
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space.39 Schelling remarks, without apparent trace of irony, that though he could
have done it other ways, he presented this proof because it was the shortest.
There is a great deal of ambiguity about this text in Naturphilosophie.
We shall shortly return to the topic of the ambiguity of the three potencies and
the questions of what they precisely designate.
(i) Eckart Förster notes a confusion in earlier versions of the
Naturphilosophie‟s construction of matter as to whether nature unfolds
sequentially, as the schema of the three potencies suggests, or whether they exist
all at once, nature popping into existence fully grown and manifesting all
qualities and operations.40 We have seen the Dynamic Process treatise suggest
that genetic method or construction involves taking the all-at-once character and
translating it into stepwise explanation. In this text, the very murkiness of the
potency structure—or to put it less kindly, the meandering though geometrical
exposition—suggests that nature exists as a plenum of operations which operate
simultaneously to do the same thing: demonstrate the non-being of difference.
Even though there seems to be some telos or hierarchy in the first two potencies,
or the domain of the first existent (matter), operationally nature always does the
same: collapse difference into indifference.
(ii) A related problem infects this and other versions of
Naturphilosophie. Since matter and space are coincident, there is no space
without matter, and matter-space is singular, not plural. The operational or
dynamic homogeneity of nature suggests the same thing: there is only one entity
and in it there occurs only one operation: ontological deflation. Other texts
suggest that nature might be inhabited by multiple centers of activity, but each of
them perfectly monadic so that there is no genuine interaction, no inside/outside
distinction, no effective plurality.41 It is obviously not the intention of
Naturphilosophie to do armchair summation of the march of empirical science,
nor to mimic the methods of the Newtonian experimentalists.
(iii) What do the potencies designate? Evidently anything that has the
triadic structure of relative identity, duplicity and relative totality, and that is
functionally recursive or repetitious. We have just seen that in the transition from
metaphysics to nature, Schelling equates metaphysical and proto-geometrical
properties:
Relative Totality
Duplicity
Relative Identity

Depth
Breadth
Length

39

|
|=> Matter (the First Existent)
|42
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At a higher level of generality, the abstract proto-logical features are equated
with:
Organism
Light
Gravity
In this text, it is not clear how these general features of nature as a whole match
up with lower-level operational features or with domains of being. The 1804
Complete System of Philosophy, and Nature-Philosophy in Particular marks
these features off, along with space/matter, as primordial principles of natural
being and devotes a special section, General Philosophy of Nature, to them, prior
to any consideration of detailed natural operations. Gravity and light are there
said to operate, respectively, as the ground of being and the cause of being.43 The
most problematic feature of this presentation is the place of the three levels of
dynamic process:
Chemical Metamorphosis (Oxidation/De-oxidation)
Electricity
Magnetism (Cohesion)
These factors are introduced into the discussion time and time again; they seem
to be the drivers or „workhorse‟ features of inorganic nature. There are also
moves to reduce dynamic levels of phenomena downward to cohesion or upward
to chemical metamorphosis; it is difficult to discern which feature is more
fundamental, especially since potencies are in some sense all repetitions of one
and the same operation. Chemical interactions are seen to involve reciprocal
changes in cohesion in the “chemical matters” or elements involved.44 In this
text, Schelling makes no distinction between a non-apparent or constitutive level
of dynamic process that is a universal feature of matter and makes matter fill
space and a higher-level perceptible but regional version of the same that
manifests as perceptible magnetism, electricity and chemical alteration, as do
both the 1800 and 1804 versions of Naturphilosophie. If all of this were not
complicated enough, Schelling seems to have two ontological paradigms
operative in this text, in addition to the substance/attribute and attribute/mode
distinctions inherited from Spinoza:
Form of Being ≈ Existence
Being [Essence ]≈ Ground

43
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The former schema was introduced in the opening paragraphs of the 1799 First
Outline and is operative in all the metaphysical expositions of the so-called
Identity Philosophy.45 The second appears in the Naturphilosophie of 1801 and
1804, but only comes into prominence in the 1809 Essay on Freedom.
Finally, there is a commanding presence of Johann Wolfgang Goethe in
this text. Schelling explicitly attempts to defend Goethe‟s color-theory, where
light is said to be unitary, not composite, and the colored appearances of things
are analyzed as epiphenomena that arise from the contrast of light and dark
surfaces being viewed in close contiguity.46 Schelling uses the term
metamorphosis that Goethe coined for the process of repeated expansion and
contraction in the development of the archetypal plant to characterize chemical
interactions, the highest level of dynamic process.47
III.
The 1804 Würzburg lecture manuscript for the Entire System of Philosophy and
of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular remained unpublished in Schelling‟s
lifetime. It is something of a patchwork, since its construction of the ideal world
incorporates materials that Hegel would have heard in Jena. Schelling‟s editorson remarks of the Naturphilosophie that it is more specific than other published
texts, and that its contents have been amplified; it now includes topics in
chemistry, astronomy and physiology.48 The sixty-one sections on philosophy in
general or the metaphysics of identity are more carefully stated and explained
than the corresponding sections of My System. The opening pages present at least
five distinct arguments about the nature of God or the absolute, viz., that:
•
•
•
•
•

knower and what is known are the same in the highest instance of
knowing
self-knowledge of that identity occurs only in reason
identity or immanent self-sameness is independent of anything
subjective or objective
God is his own self-affirmation, or has being in virtue of his very idea
the form of God‟s absolute self-affirmation is repeated in reason.49

45
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While Schelling begins to use the term “God” in at least a quasi-theistic
sense in Philosophy and Religion, the word indicates only the Spinozistic deus
sive natura here and is conceived in a fundamentally Spinozistic way as the
identity of self-affirmation and what is affirmed, natura naturans and natura
naturata. And while Schelling has obviously gone back to the Ethics again and
pursued its Germanic translation in more detail, he has also carried forward the
generic Platonism or Neo-Platonism of the Bruno in insisting that appearances
have the ontological standing only of privation, of being infected by NichtWesen, non-being. The finite or the realm of appearance is precisely the relative
being and non-being of the particular within the universe.50 “Considered in and of
itself, nothing is finite.”51
When we turn to the philosophy of nature, there is a bit of a surprise. The
framework features of nature and the preeminent items of the first two potencies
(gravity and light) are set apart in a general Naturphilosophie. Each finite item is
monadic, apparently in itself but constituted by external relations. Being nothing
in itself, it is but a mirror of the cosmos, hence a quantum of affirmation or
activity allied to one of being-affirmed or passivity.52 As part of the affirmed, it is
body and appears in space, the form of mere externality; as ensouled or part of
the affirming, it is in time. The very forms of appearance express the non-being
of things.53 Pure space combined with the point yields the line of time. The
dimensions of space contracted to a point yield impermeability, and we have at
least the simulacrum of Kant‟s idea of matter: occupied or impenetrable space. 54
The apparent materiality of the finite item of appearance is therefore a product of
a process of expansion and contraction—the process that in the development of
the plant Goethe termed metamorphosis. Schelling contrasts the purely active or
productive character of this construction of matter with Kant‟s which depends on
a mere concept of reflection: force or conatus, mere striving. He remarks how the
item of appearance is like a rainbow, the infinite substance, as it were, refracted
through the prism of non-being or particularity—a comment that unconsciously
presupposes the Newtonian color theory, not Goethe‟s.55
Schelling articulates a non-mechanistic theory of matter and motion in
order to argue that gravity is one of the primitive items of nature—not
magnitude, nor mass, nor motion. Neither the substance of matter nor space itself
is composite or even intrinsically divisible.56 Matter or material substance is the
identity of unity and totality, and motion, the active or affirming side of matter;
motion is the reciprocal projection (Ineinsbildung) of space and time into one
another. After Spinoza, Schelling conceives motion-and-rest as one of the infinite
50

§ 31, Zus., SW, I/6, 180-81.
§ 17, Fol., SW, I/ 6, 161.
52
§§ 66-67, Erl., SW, I/6, 217-218.
53
§§ 69-71, SW, I/ 6, 219-221.
54
§ 74, Proof-§ 76, Erl., Proof, SW, I/6, 222-225.
55
§ 76, Zus., Anm.1-§ 77, SW, I/6, 226-230. Goethe‟s theory assumes one views a colored surface
through a prism, Newton‟s that one views the surface illuminated by passing light through the
prism.
56
§ 83, SW I/6, 229.
51
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attributes of God/nature. The passive “mass” that is the object of mechanism‟s
calculations is abstracted from matter, which even as it appears in the inorganic,
is as much self-moving as is the organism.57 The inertial mass that is the focus of
mechanism is but passivity, inborn defect, “the original sin of matter.”58 Gravity
is, therefore, the intrinsic relation of matter to its ground, infinite substance, not
an externally communicated impulse which is the measure of one‟s finite body‟s
influence on another, nor Newton‟s attractive force.59 Baader is credited for
positing gravity as an independent force and refuting Kant‟s hypothesis of
attractive force being “action at a distance.”60 The so-call law of gravity reveals
that every point of the universe is the mid-point. Schelling remarks:
Hence the ground of gravity is the undiscoverable depth of nature itself,
which can itself never step forth into daylight, that whereby everything
else is birthed and sees the light of day—the mysterious night, the fate
of all things, or the maternal principle, since all things are conceived in it
and born from it as their ground.61
The ideal counterpart of gravity is light, or the Lichtwesen; the two are
the infinite attributes of nature, expressing the affirming and affirmed aspects of
the one substance. While gravity, acting on passive mass or the mere res extensa,
is the real filling of space, light is its ideal description.62 Unable to categorize its
ideality accurately, Newton was driven to empirical nonsense in talking of the
“immateriality of light”; it is reflection, not reason, which has recourse to
empirical concepts and divides nature into “mater” and “spirit,” quixotically
placing light with “dead matter.” Viewed in itself, light is the boundary of nature
or the threshold of intelligence. Viewed together, the two principles of nature,
light and gravity, are centrifugal and centripetal energies, light defining things in
their particularity, gravity in their identity. Gravity is the ground of things, light
their cause; the former defines the nicht-für-sich-Seyn of things, the latter their
in-sich-selbst-Seyn.63 The varying relations of these two principles to another (the
process of metamorphosis) establish the different levels or potencies in nature,
and within the potencies, establish the Evolutionsreihe of natural phenomena.64
Space will not permit a detailed look at the “Specific Naturphilosophie.”
Absent that, the best I can do is to reproduce Schelling‟s own diagram of the first
two potencies, and complete it with the third. In contrast to the disorganization of
the 1801 Naturphilosophie, which (charitably construed) can suggest that all
natural process occur at once and are (metaphysically viewed) the same
57

§ 85, Zus. 1-3, SW, I/6, 242.
§ 88, Zus., SW, I/6, 246.
59
§§ 92-94, SW, I/6, 250-52.
60
§ 95, Erl. , SW, I/6, 254-55.
61
§ 97, Zus., SW, I/6, 256-257. This remark, and subsequent ones about light, seems to anticipate
the Ground/Existent categorial scheme of the 1809 Essay on Freedom.
62
§ 103, SW, I/6, 263.
63
§ 105, Anm., SW, I/6, 266-67.
64
§ 108, Zus. and § 133, Zus., 3-§ 138, SW, I/6, 269, 299-305.
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operation, the 1804 system, with its tight organization, detail, and ideal-real
symmetry suggest that the processes are ordered teleologically toward the
intelligence-nested-in-organism that is humankind and therefore unfold in a
graduated sequence.
The Potencies in the 1804 Specific Naturphilosophie65
Third Potency

Third Dimension
Second Dimension
First Dimension

regarded in form

regarded in substance

sensitivity
excitability
reproduction

animals
protozoa
plants

Second Potency

Third Dimension
Second Dimension
First Dimension

regarded in form

regarded in substance

chemical action
electricity
magnetism

heat
light
sound

First Potency

Third Dimension
Second Dimension
First Dimension

regarded in form

regarded in substance

spherical cohesion
relative cohesion (breadth)
active cohesion

hydrogen,oxygen: water
phlogiston: air
sulfur: metals, fire

Figure 1
Considerably more detail could be unpacked in the third potency, where a
mirroring of the ideal and real breaks forth in phenomena such as sexual
dimorphism or the symmetrical organization of animal physiology, and where the
matters of sensitivity or perception (their real basis) are correlated with
perceptual capacities (ideal bases):

65

Based on SW, I/6, 369 and 392-404.
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System of Sensation (Sinn)66
Dynamic Process

Sensory Basis/Perception

Biological Function

Magnetism
Electricity
Chemism

Hearing
Sight/Smell
Taste/Touch

Reproduction
Excitability
Sensitivity

Sound
Light
Heat

Figure 2
Sound is accounted the highest perception, since it is the perceptual vehicle of
language, the body of thought. Both sight and smell communicate sensory
information over a distance, while taste and touch are more local. Sensation and
perception unite apparently internal and extra-somatic information in such a way
that crude binary ideas of realism and idealism are refuted.

66

§§ 225-226, SW, I/6, 443-45. The order of the potencies is reversed here. Hearing/sound is said
to be magnetism returned into itself, the first Ineinsbildung of the infinite into the finite. It is the
basis of speech (Sprache), which is the instrument of reason (§ 232, SW, I/6, 454-55). “Speech is
the highest item of nature: it is the [W/w]ord made flesh” (§ 259 Zus., SW, I/6, 491-492).

15

